Stopping Nuclear Power Plants: A Memoir by Sirico, Louis J., Jr.
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 2 
2010 
Stopping Nuclear Power Plants: A Memoir 
Louis J. Sirico Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Louis J. Sirico Jr., Stopping Nuclear Power Plants: A Memoir, 21 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 35 (2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol21/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of 
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2010]
STOPPING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: A MEMOIR
Louis J. SIRIco, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, I worked for Ralph Nader. Among my projects
was helping to stop utilities from building and operating nuclear
power plants. From our viewpoint, the plants were dangerous and
held the potential for destroying lives, injuring people, and ruining
vast swaths of American land. The risks they posed led to massive
citizen protests wherever utilities were investing in nuclear energy.
Despite the highly visible nature of the controversy, very little
literature chronicles this antinuclear movement.1 Although I
played only a small role in it, I have wanted to offer my memories of
that time, a time when citizen action contributed to a major societal
shift.
In the early 1950s, the promise of nuclear power seemed all
but dead. Utility companies feared the possibility of an atomic ca-
tastrophe and the inability to gain adequate insurance coverage for
a major accident. Yet, they continued to receive boundless encour-
agement to build from the federal government. The bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, fear of nuclear
power's destructive force and perhaps guilt among those who had
developed it led to the "Atoms for Peace" initiative during the Ei-
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
1. For the history of nuclear power during this time, see JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI,
THE STATE OF NUCLEAR POWER: CONFLICT & CONTROL IN THE WESTERN WORLD
(1984); STEVEN MARK COHN, Too CHEAP TO METER: AN ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM (1997); GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL
WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM: THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946-
1962 (1984); JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987). For
economic and technical analyses of nuclear power during that era, see RALPH NA-
DER & JOHN ABBOTFS, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY (1977); RON LANOUE, Nu-
CLEAR PLANTS: THE MORE THEY BUILD, THE MORE YOU PAY (Center for the Study of
Responsive Law 1977); WILLIAM C. WOOD, NUCLEAR SAFETY: RisKs AND REGULATION
(1983). For accounts of two specific controversies, see JOHN G. FULLER, WE AL-
MOST LOST DETROIT (1975) (recounting the 1966 partial meltdown at the Enrico
Fermi plant near Toledo and Detroit); DONALD W. STEVER, JR., SEABROOK AND THE
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: THE LICENSING OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
(1980) (recounting the controversial licensing of the Seabrook plant in New
Hampshire). For a practical manual for citizens opposing nuclear plants, see SKIP
LAITER, CITIZENS' GUIDE TO NUCLEAR POWER (Center for the Study of Responsive
Law 1975).
(35)
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senhower years.2 One part of the promise of nuclear power was the
claim by Lewis Strauss, the Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission
that it would be very inexpensive, in fact, "too cheap to meter."3
In 1957, the Duquesne Light Company began operating the
nation's first nuclear plant in Shippingsport, Pennsylvania, near
Pittsburgh. 4 By 1976, 60 nuclear plants were licensed to operate. 5
Meanwhile, a popular antinuclear movement was growing.
I became a participant in the movement when stopping nu-
clear power became one of my projects at work. I drafted motions
and rulemakings submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
edited extensive materials, wrote news releases, and spoke at confer-
ences. I found the experience exciting. I was just a few years out of
law school and able to play on the national level in a cause that
pitted us against a clearly evil opponent.
Moreover, I worked for the nation's most prominent consumer
advocate. Ralph Nader dominated the public interest world. He
was disciplined, knowledgeable, and most of all, charismatic like no
one else. He could speak to an audience, talk way past his allotted
time, and still hold the rapt attention of his listeners. One could
disagree with Ralph, but after talking with him, one could under-
stand the merits of his position and leave inspired. Because other
advocates lacked his presence, they could not gain the visibility that
he enjoyed. As a result, his advocacy on this issue was invaluable.
I particularly remember Ralph's 1976 debate with MIT profes-
sor Norman Rasmussen at the National Press Club.6 Rasmussen
had headed a $3 million government study concluding that nuclear
power was safe. 7 Although Ralph certainly lacked Rasmussen's
technical expertise, he possessed detailed knowledge of the subject
and also could persuasively emphasize his big theme: the Rasmus-
sen study was defective, because it failed to consider such hazardous
2. See IRA CHERNUS, EISENHOWER'S ATOMS FOR PEACE (2002) (examining the
rhetoric and ideology of this policy agenda).
3. See NADER & ABBOTrS, supra note 1, at 28-29.
4. See Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, History, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
emerg-preparedness/history.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (outlining history of
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's work on emergency response and
preparedness).
5. See BuPP & DERLAN, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Ralph Nader & Norman Rasmussen, Addresses before the National Press
Club (NPR radio broadcastJune 1, 1976) (debating nation's nuclear policy).
7. See NADER & ABBOTS, supra note 1, at 119-22 (criticizing Rasmussen report);
WOOD, supra note 1, at 41-43 (describing and critiquing Rasmussen's Reactor
Safety Study).
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items as the aging of a plant, serious earthquakes, sabotage, terror-
ism, and human error.8 Ralph could hold his own.
II. A CITIZENS MOVEMENT
The antinuclear movement was truly a citizens movement. Al-
though many of the members participated because they lived near a
nuclear plant or near the site where a utility company had chosen
to build one, other members also joined because they distrusted
atomic energy. A rally in Washington, D.C., could draw thousands
as could national conferences. Our monthly newspaper, "Critical
Mass," enjoyed a wide circulation. In seven states, citizens placed
initiatives on the ballot to stop or slow down the construction of
nuclear plants. Although the campaigns proved unsuccessful, they
strengthened the grass roots efforts to challenge nuclear energy. I
admit to having misgivings about the initiatives; to my mind, some
of the leaders lacked any political sophistication and were capable
of doing more harm than good.
Environmental causes can cross traditional political lines.
Many conservatives care deeply about the environment. In those
days, we often used the word "conservation" as opposed to "environ-
mental," for fear that the latter word could conjure up radical ste-
reotypes and scare off potential supporters.
Washington groups gave local citizens a stronger voice. At
home, they could do little more than protest at public hearings,
hold small gatherings, and write letters to the local newspaper. Few
had the local counsel necessary to lodge legal challenges. Yet, in
Washington, we could address the powers that be with administra-
tive filings, mass rallies, media coverage, and an occasional lawsuit.
Thus national and local groups worked hand in hand.
For me, the intensity of citizen action was impressive. Some-
times national groups are charged with claiming to represent a mas-
sive group of supporters, but really representing no one but
themselves and a few financial contributors. In this movement,
however, massive support did exist. It included people from all
walks of life. Many of them had schooled themselves in utility eco-
nomics and became avid readers of "Public Utility Fortnightly," the
leading trade magazine. Their numbers also included serious
scientists, members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, environ-
mentalist Barry Commoner, and most prominently Harvard profes-
sors and Nobel Prize winners George Wald and Henry Kendall.
8. See id.
2010]
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Members also included Australian-born pediatrician Helen
Caldicott and the owner of a Florida supermarket. The many enter-
tainers who contributed included Jackson Browne and Joni
Mitchell.
III. THE ISSUES
Although the questionable safety of nuclear plants held center
stage, a number of related issues generated serious discussion, in-
cluding waste disposal, the lack of sufficient insurance coverage,
worker safety, inadequate evacuation plans, the presence of alterna-
tive energy sources, and the questionable financial wisdom of in-
vesting in nuclear power.9
Waste disposal. Even today, nuclear plants produce radioactive
waste with long-term hazardous consequences. For example, pluto-
nium-239 has a half-life of 24,000 years; that is, half of the radioac-
tivity of a quantity will decay in 24,000 years. 10 As of this writing,
the government has yet to establish facilities for permanent disposal
of high-level waste. Since the 1970s, the primary proposal has been
for "geologic disposal," that is, storing waste in a geologic formation
so stable that the waste could not escape into the environment.
An early candidate for a permanent disposal site was the salt
domes near Lyons, Kansas."1 The presence of salt indicates a lack
of groundwater that the waste could contaminate. Salt also pro-
vides a radiation shield. The government, however, abandoned the
proposal when it learned that the owners of a nearby salt mine had
pumped water into their mine. As a result, the high heat of the
waste canisters would vaporize any water they contacted and expel
steam water, salt, and radioactive waste. The government later
sought other suitable salt sites, but without success. Most recently,
the Department of Energy had proposed a site at Yucca Mountain,
near Las Vegas, Nevada, as a permanent repository; however, politi-
cal opposition and potential geological dangers have doomed the
proposal. 12
Liabilty insurance. Because the private insurance industry has
been unwilling to write adequate liability policies for nuclear plants,
9. See id. at 59-68 (providing overview issues arising in nuclear debate).
10. See id. at 149 (providing background on environmental effects of nuclear
waste).
11. See id. at 153-54 (discussing the failure of this proposed solution).
12. SeeDavid M. Herszenhorn, Yucca Mountain Plan for Nuclear Waste Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009.
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Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act,1 3 which continues to par-
tially indemnify the industry. This free insurance serves as a subsidy
to the utility companies. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, it amounts to an annual subsidy of $600,000 to each reac-
tor.14 Moreover, it raises persistent questions: If nuclear power
poses only the slightest risk of catastrophe, why will private insur-
ance companies refuse to provide adequate coverage, and why does
the industry need this insurance in the first place?
Worker safety. Worker safety has always been an issue. Per-
haps the story of Karen Silkwood, as portrayed in the 1983 motion
picture "Silkwood," has been the most dramatic. 15 Silkwood
worked as a lab technician at the Kerr-McGee nuclear facility near
Crescent, Oklahoma where she made plutonium pellets for fuel
rods. A union activist, she publicly complained about lax safety pro-
cedures at the plant and was one of the many workers contami-
nated by plutonium. On November 13, 1974, she drove to
Oklahoma City to meet with a union leader and a New York Times
reporter to give them a folder of documents that would support her
claim that Kerr-McGee had falsified records on quality controls.
Later that night, Silkwood was found dead in what appeared to be a
single-car accident. Her folder, however, was never found. Contro-
versy arose over whether she fell asleep at the wheel or was forced
off the road by another car. After considerable litigation, Kerr-Mc-
Gee settled with the Silkwood family for $1.38 million, but admitted
no liability.
I had some involvement in an incident concerning worker
safety. In 1975, a New Mexico state official telephoned the Free-
dom of Information Clearinghouse, a part of Nader's Center for
the Study of Responsive Law, to seek information on how to con-
ceal information about contaminated water at uranium mines in
the western part of that state. When the Clearinghouse attorney
explained that his group was concerned about making information
public and not suppressing it, the official hung up. Further investi-
gation disclosed that the drinking water for the miners and their
families was dangerously contaminated and not even acceptable as
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210; see also UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY Com-
MISSION, FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF FUNDS, http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2009) (explaining Price-Anderson Act).
14. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 2986, NUCLEAR POWER'S ROLE IN GENER-
ATING ELECTRICITY 29, Box 3-1 (2008) (assessing future viability of nuclear technol-
ogy as domestic energy source).
15. SILKVOOD (MGM 1983).
20101
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treated waste water. I handled media coverage of the story and
helped it become the subject of an article on page 2 of the Washing-
ton Post (no mean feat). I must have played a larger role in investi-
gating the incident, but cannot recall what it might have been.
Emergency planning. Under current regulations of the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, utilities must give "reasonable assur-
ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological emergency."' 6 These regulations require de-
fining emergency planning zones. The first zone includes the area
within a ten mile radius of the plant, the "plume exposure path-
way," in which individuals could encounter direct radiation expo-
sure.1 7 The second zone includes the "ingestion pathway," the area
within a fifty mile radius in which radioactivity could contaminate
water, food crops, and livestock.18
Even with these arguably conservative estimates, evacuating
people from these areas would seem highly impractical. According
to Dr. Samuel Epstein, professor emeritus at the University of Chi-
cago School of Public Health, "About 80 million Americans in 37
states live within 40 miles of a nuclear reactor, including residents
of New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Miami, Phoenix,
Cleveland, and Boston."'19 He states, "If a meltdown were to occur,
safe evacuation would be impossible and many thousands would
suffer from radiation poisoning or cancer.120
The futility of evacuation plans has long been a concern in the
anti-nuclear movement. I remember it first arising when Maine
Public Interest Research Group, a student organization, criticized
the problematic emergency plan put forth by the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Company with respect to its Maine Yankee plant in
the early 1970s.
Alternative energy. In the 1970s, "alternative energy" meant
solar energy. Wind power barely received a mention as did ob-
taining energy from biomass. Certainly environmental groups were
advocating these methods; however, their viability seemed problem-
atic to many. 21 Utility companies had no interest in promoting
16. 10 C.F.R. pt. 50.47(a)(1)(i).
17. Id. pt. 50.47(c) (1) (iii) (B) (2).
18. Id.
19. Push for New Nuclear Power Sputters, But Old Reactors Still Pose Cancer Risks
(July 27, 2009), available at http://world-wire.com/news/0907270001.htm (dis-
cussing effort to block legislation permitting further development of nuclear
power plants).
20. Id. (discussing health risks of living near nuclear reactors).
21. See NADER & ABBo-r-rs, supra note 1, at 30 (describing solar energy as an
'ugly duckling," as far as the energy industry perceived it).
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these alternatives. While the companies could convert to nuclear
generated power by modifying their existing technology for gener-
ating energy out of fossil fuel, they could not employ this technol-
ogy to harness solar power. Solar power permitted individual users
to generate their own electricity. Thus, solar power was an eco-
nomic threat to the utility industry.
Because alternative energy sources seemed so futuristic, envi-
ronmental groups sometimes were forced to argue that clean coal
plants were eminently feasible; desulfurization equipment (scrub-
bers) would satisfy air quality standards, and the true cost of nuclear
energy would not be much greater than coal energy. As part of its
public relations strategy in opposition to these arguments, the nu-
clear industry created a simple electronic game for school children
that let them calculate how to produce enough energy for society.
In choosing among different amounts of coal, oil, and nuclear en-
ergy, the students would conclude that the future required a con-
siderable amount of nuclear power.
Financing nuclear power. Antinuclear groups have always
found a strong argument in emphasizing the enormous expense of
constructing, running and decommissioning nuclear plants. The
plants cost more to build than fossil fuel plants, the cost of uranium
rose, and the plants often encountered problems that forced them
out of service and compelled the utilities to purchase energy else-
where. Moreover, at the end of the plant's life, the plant must be
decommissioned by mothballing the plant, entombing it in con-
crete, or dismantling it. The Fort St. Vrain plant in Colorado was
the first commercial nuclear plant to undergo decommissioning;
the process was completed after six years in 1996 at an expenditure
of $188 million. 22
In the 1960s and 1970s, cost analyses were the products of util-
ity companies, vendors of reactors, and government agencies, and
therefore tended to be quite optimistic. 23 As a result gigantic cost
overruns became common. By the 1980s, even an article in busi-
ness-oriented Forbes was pointing a finger of blame:
The failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as
the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disas-
22. See ROGER DUNSTAN, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CALIFORNIA
39 (California Research Bureau, April 2002), available at http://www.library.ca.
gov/crb/02/08/02-008.pdf (outlining risks and benefits of nuclear energy produc-
tion in California).
23. See MARK COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE
OR RELAPSE? 2 (2009), available at http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/cooperre-
port-neconomics062009.pdf (wading into nuclear policy debate).
2010]
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ter on a monumental scale. The utility industry has al-
ready invested $125 billion in nuclear power, with an
additional $140 billion to come before the decade is out,
and only the blind, or the biased, can now think that most
of the money has been well spent. It is a defeat for the
U.S. consumer and for the competitiveness of U.S. indus-
try, for the utilities that undertook the program and for
the private enterprise system that made it possible. 24
All these arguments were easy for the public to grasp and thus
fueled the fires of discontent. Moreover, they were easy enough for
us to master. With access to a few experts, we quickly became capa-
ble of speaking, writing, and lobbying effectively. I think some util-
ity executives understood that the arguments had considerable
truth to them and generated at least some misgivings about the in-
dustry position. Yet, when an executive makes a commitment to a
dubious endeavor and effectively ties his or her future to its success,
admitting a mistake becomes exceedingly difficult and may amount
to professional suicide. This conflict may explain some angry out-
bursts by executives who attended our conferences.
I have also wondered about a particular energy lobbyist who
sometimes attended our events. He sported very long hair and a
beard, probably so that we would think he was a child of the 1960s
and trustworthy. His sole task seemed to be to talk before the televi-
sion cameras and state that he had worked for the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission and that nuclear power was safe. I never saw him
look anything but grimly serious. I am willing to bet that he hated
his job.
IV. THE DEMISE OF NUCLEAR POWER
By 1976, 60 reactors stood completed with 146 more either
under construction or on order.25 During the late 1960s and early
1970s, utilities ordered 240 nuclear reactors. 26 However, they even-
tually canceled half these orders and in building the rest, encoun-
tered dramatic cost overruns. 27 The demand for new reactors
stopped abruptly with the last order occurring in 1976.
24. James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FoRuEs, Feb. 11, 1985, at cover, quoted in
COOPER, supra note 23, at 13 (presenting misgivings over level of expenditures
made by nuclear industry).
25. See BuPP & DERIAN, supra note 1, at 7.
26. See COOPER, supra note 23, at 33 (outlining history of nuclear power in
United States).
27. Id. (providing historical overview of development of domestic nuclear
development).
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Reflecting on the end of the nuclear decade, economist
Charles Komanoff identified "ten blows that stopped nuclear
power": (1) the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, which weakened the econ-
omy, reduced the use of electricity, destroyed the financial ability of
utilities to order new plants, and made the public suspicious of cor-
porate America; (2) India's detonation of its first atomic bomb,
which raised fears that nuclear power opened the path to manufac-
turing nuclear weapons, led the government to slow the develop-
ment of plutonium fields, thus increasing the cost of uranium; (3)
in 1975, the replacing of the Atomic Energy Commission with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which moved nuclear regulation
to a more safety-conscious agency whose regulations increased the
costs of producing nuclear power; (4) the 1975 fire at the Browns
Ferry plant in Alabama where workers used candles to find leaks in
insulation, which almost caused a meltdown and did cause the shut-
down of two generators for nineteen months; (5) the resignation of
three managers in General Electric's nuclear engineering division
who then became experts for the anti-nuclear movement; (6) the
writings of physicist-environmentalist Amory Lovins which distin-
guished between "hard energy paths" and "soft energy paths," with
the latter employing decentralized energy sources, renewable
sources, and conservation technologies; (7) the 1977 Seabrook,
New Hampshire protest in which 18,000 non-violent protestors oc-
cupied the proposed site of a plant and encouraged grassroots ac-
tivism across the country; (8) the 1979 partial meltdown at the
Three Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, which exposed shocking
lapses in regulation and challenged any public trust in the safety of
nuclear plants as well as demonstrating the impracticality of plant
evacuation plans; (9) the tightening of the money supply in 1979,
followed by back-to-back recessions, which diminished the growth
of energy demand and led to the cancellation of dozens of plants;
and (10) the admission by Pacific Gas & Electric that it had inadver-
tently disabled the earthquake protection systems at the California
Diablo Canyon reactors which were near seismic fault lines, thus
embarrassing the industry and ended efforts to streamline the pro-
cess of licensing reactors. 28
Komanoff omits the Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet
Union and other later events, because he believes that the growth
28. See Charles Komanoff, 10 Blows That Stopped Nuclear Power, http://
www.komanoff.net/nuclear-power/10_blows.php (setting forth prominent events
contributing to waning public support for nuclear energy).
20101
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of nuclear power had ceased before they occurred.29 According to
Komanoff, "the mark of activists is evident in all ten blows, and,
indeed, in the entire quarter-century withering of nuclear power."30
He writes,
Only a mass movement could engender a social fabric and
a political context in which the dangers of nuclear power
could be made manifest, in which necessary and costly re-
actor safeguards could be made mandatory, in which pro-
test and resistance could be nurtured, and in which
alternatives could be legitimized.31
At the end of the 1933 movie "King Kong," impresario Carl
Denham proclaims, "It was beauty killed the beast. '3 2 As for nu-
clear power, it succumbed because it fell for the false beauty of the
promise of profitable, yet inexpensive energy that concealed
hazards and financial costs. In the end, nuclear power proved a
financial disaster. Yet, it took the action of concerned citizens to
unmask this failure and hasten demise of the nuclear era. I am glad
that I had the chance to be part of that effort.
29. Id. (stating why Chernobyl disaster does not appear on list).
30. Id. (discussing success of anti-nuclear movement).
31. Id. (outlining effectiveness of anti-nuclear movement).
32. KING KONG (RKO Radio Pictures 1933).
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